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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
FRANK LEROY ARCHULETA, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No, 890382-CA 
Priority No, 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of second degree 
murder in the Second Judicial District Court. This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 
(Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was the evidence sufficient to establish 
defendant's guilt of second degree murder? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52 (a): 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the 
facts without a jury or with an advisory 
jury, the court shall find the facts 
specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment 
shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in 
granting or refusing interlocutory 
injunctions the court shall similarly set 
forth the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law which constitute the grounds of its 
action. Requests for findings are not 
necessary for purposes of review. Findings 
of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be 
given to the opportunity of the trial court 
to judge the credibility of the witnesses 
• • • • 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-203 (Supp. 1989): 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in 
the second degree if the actor: 
(d) while in the commission, attempted 
commission, or immediate flight from the 
commission or attempted commission of . . . 
child abuse, as defined in Subsection 76-5-
109(2)a, when the victim is younger than 14 
years of age, causes the death of another 
person . 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109(2)(a) (Supp. 1989): 
(2) Any person who inflicts upon a child 
serious physical injury or, having the care 
and custody of such child, causes or permits 
another to inflict serious physical injury 
upon a child is guilty of an offense as 
follows: 
(a) If done intentionally or knowingly, 
the offense is a felony of the second degree 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with second degree murder. 
Defendant was convicted before Judge Roth on December 4. 1988. 
Judge Roth sentenced defendant to the Utah State Prison for a 
term of not less than five years but which may be for life. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Preston Sherman died of battered child syndrome on July 
31, 1988 (T. 62, 538-39). The medical examiner concluded that 
the immediate cause of Preston's death was multiple blunt force 
injuries (T. 60). Among these injuries were included several 
bruises to the face and head which were freshly inflicted (T. 38-
39). Preston suffered from edema (swelling) of the brain which 
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could have been caused by a recent blow to the head, or a lack of 
oxygen or a lack of blood flow to the brain caused by shock (T. 
39-40, 67). The deep musculature in the back of his chest wall 
and the back of his right lung were freshly bruised consistent 
with either a severe beating or an automobile accident (T. 42). 
Preston's abdomen was distended and his ascending colon 
and the mesentery (supporting tissues) were bruised (T. 45-46). 
Also bruised were the solus muscles which run along the spinal 
column (T. 48). These are all deep, protected structures that 
require a forceful blow to inflict the injuries observed (T. 46-
49). 
Preston's fingers and toes had suffered recent 
contusions and abrasions consistent with squeezing or crushing 
and inconsistent with slamming them in drawers or kicking hard 
objects (T. 49-51, 57-59, 545). On his right buttocks and right 
calf were fresh, small, oval-shaped burns that were well 
circumscribed and caused by something that was quite hot such as 
heated metal (T. 52-55). On his left, fourth toe was an older 
burn mark (T. 57-58). On the underneath at the base of his penis 
was an old burn scar similar to that caused by a cigarette or 
other pointed source of heat (T. 59-60). 
The severe injuries Preston suffered would be painful 
and would most likely produce shock (T. 70, 543). Initially, he 
would probably cry and as shock developed, he would become 
lethargic and, later, comatose (T. 70, 543). At 3:30 in the 
afternoon a few short hours before his death, however, Preston 
was laughing and playing in a bubblebath (T. 388, 390). When his 
mother left him at about 7:30 p.m., Preston did not appear 
injured (T. 397-98). 
Defendant had previously been observed hitting Preston 
hard in the middle of his back (T. 490-91, 495). He was also 
observed twice bathing Preston in a tub of cold water and ice 
cubes because Preston wet his pants (T. 491-92, 494-95). 
Defendant had earlier been charged in Juvenile Court 
with abusing Preston (T. 635). Furthermore, defendant admitted 
he abused Preston (T. 662). Defendant spanked Preston every 
other day or so for wetting his pants, put him on the toilet for 
several hours at a time, and placed him in a cold bath (T. 638, 
664-65, 667). Defendant also admitted spanking Preston shortly 
before he died for wetting his pants (T. 645). Nancy Delgado, 
Preston's mother, never severely punished Preston. She would 
merely slap Preston's hands or swat his bottom (T. 284, 355). 
Once defendant began living with Preston, the child began 
receiving bruises (T. 304). 
Prior to his death, Preston sustained injuries that 
alarmed medical caretakers and raised the suspicion of abuse. On 
January 22, 1988, Preston was treated for the burn on his penis 
(T. 98). It was a localized, circumscribed burn inconsistent 
with the alleged cause by a soup spill into his lap (T. 100-01). 
On March 21, 1988, Family Services were called to investigate 
Preston's multiple bruises on his face, ears and buttocks along 
with a laceration on his penis (T. 108). The treating physician 
opined that Preston had been abused (T. 111). 
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Defendant was alone with Preston at the time Preston 
died (T. 200). Nancy Delgado, Preston's mother, had gone to 
Burger King to buy dinner (T. 645). Defendant claims he heard 
Preston grunt, went into the bathroom, and found Preston on the 
floor having difficulty breathing (T. 646-47). However, the 
medical evidence showed Preston's injuries were inconsistent with 
defendant's story but were sustained by a much greater force than 
a fall off a toilet onto a carpeted floor (T. 42, 46, 49, 63, 67, 
71, 76, 542, 546). Furthermore, many of Preston's injuries were 
less than two hours old, and some could have been made within a 
few minutes before death (T. 61, 62). 
Defendant offered inconsistent explanations of 
Preston's death. At the scene, he said Preston must have 
swallowed a bone or a razor (T. 147). At trial, he denied this 
statement (T. 669). He also stated at the scene that he was in 
another room when he heard Preston cry out or scream in the 
bathroom, and found Preston clutching his belly saying it hurt 
(T. 164-65, 182). On route to the hospital, he repeated the 
story (T. 169). Defendant later stated that he did not know 
whether he found Preston on the toilet or on the floor (T. 191). 
Defendant also gave a statement that said Preston grunted before 
defendant came into the bathroom, was lying on the floor with his 
right arm shaking but did not speak (T. 507-08). When defendant 
was informed that Preston was dead, he asked "does this mean I am 
going to be locked away forever?" (T. 194). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Preston Sherman died of battered child syndrome at the 
age of two years. Defendant had a history of abusing Preston and 
admitted using excessive force on Preston. Defendant was alone 
with Preston on the night Preston died. Preston had bruises 
which were less than two hours old. The finding of the court 
that defendant was abusing Preston is supported by the clear 
weight of the evidence. Thus, there was no mistake in convicting 
defendant of second degree murder. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH 
DEFENDANT'S GUILT 
The Utah Supreme Court applies Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 52(a) when reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of 
the evidence. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192 (Utah 1987); 
see also Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-26(7) (Supp. 1989). This rule 
provides that "[fjindings of fact . . . shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). The court will set aside the 
findings only "if the findings are against the clear weight of 
the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made . . .H 
Walker, 743 P.2d at 193. 
In State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786 (Utah 1988), the 
court upheld a bench trial of second degree murder against a 
sufficiency of the evidence appeal. The court stated that the 
-K-
standard applied to bench trials required that the clear weight 
of the evidence presented at trial not be contrary to the 
verdict. Id. at 787. However, the court accords deference to 
the trial court's ability and opportunity to evaluate the 
credibility and demeanor of the witnesses. j[d* "[W]e will 
review the record to see if the clear weight of the evidence, not 
including demeanor and credibility, is contrary to the verdict." 
Id. The court held that the evidence placed defendant at the 
scene of the crime and the physical evidence was consistent with 
the trial court's judgment. Although the defendant presented an 
alibi, the court deferred to the trial court's determination of 
defendant's credibility. JUi. at 788. Thus, the court was not of 
a "definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made." Id. 
In the present case, defendant contends there is 
insufficient evidence to support the conviction because the 
evidence "strongly suggest[s] that Nancy Delgado had disciplined 
Preston Sherman." Defendant also argues that Nancy Delgado "also 
caused serious bruising to the child . . . and that she was also 
alone with the child in the bathroom" (Br. of App. 5). However, 
defendant's evaluation of the standard of review is misapplied. 
Merely because defendant claims Nancy Delgado also disciplined 
Preston, does not mean that a mistake has been made. 
Furthermore, the clear weight of the evidence is not contrary to 
the verdict. The testimony and physical evidence presented at 
trial supports the trial court's verdict that defendant caused 
Preston Sherman's death. 
The statutory requirements of second degree murder are: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in 
the second degree if the actor: 
(d) while in the commission, attempted 
commission, or immediate flight from the 
commission or attempted commission of • . . 
child abuse, as defined in Subsection 76-5-
109(2)a, when the victim is younger than 14 
years of age, causes the death of another 
person . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1989). Subsection 76-5-
109(2)(a) defines child abuse as: 
(2) Any person who inflicts upon a child 
serious physical injury or, having the care 
and custody of such child, causes or permits 
another to inflict serious physical injury 
upon a child is guilty of an offense as 
follows: 
(a) If done intentionally or knowingly, 
the offense is a felony of the second degree 
. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109 (Supp. 1989). Preston Sherman was a 
victim of battered child syndrome (T. 623, 71). Preston had 
multiple blunt force injuries to his chest, abdomen, and head. 
He also had multiple internal injuries and burns on his right 
buttock and calf (T. 52, 60). The multiple injuries, some which 
were less than two hours old, caused Preston's death (T. 61, 62). 
Preston had a circular old burn scar on the base of his penis, 
which looked similar to a cigarette burn (T. 59-60). He also had 
burns and contusions on his toes and fingers (T. 49-51, 57-59). 
These injuries, in multiple stages of healing, led to the 
diagnosis of battered child syndrome (T. 64-65, 538-39). 
The evidence presented showed defendant, not Nancy, 
physically abused Preston. Preston had been treated for a burn 
on his penis on January 22, 1988. The first and second degree 
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burns were on the scrotum and shaft of his penis (T. 97-98). The 
defendant, who was alone with Preston at the time he was burned, 
stated that Preston had spilled soup on himself, causing the burn 
(T. 630). However, doctors testified the burn mark was 
inconsistent with defendant's testimony (T. 59, 100). It was a 
localized, circumscribed burn and there were no burns on his 
buttocks, on the back of his thighs, nor were there splash marks 
or drip marks which is normal in a splash burn (T. 100). Thus, 
the burn was not caused by a hot soup spill, which would lead to 
an inference that defendant had caused the burn. 
Furthermore, Preston also started receiving bruises and 
scrapes on his body after defendant started living with him. 
These injuries were reported to the Social Services Department 
which sent an agent to investigate (T. 86). The agent visited 
Nancy Delgado's home and took Preston to the hospital for an 
examination (T. 89). Preston was diagnosed as suffering from 
suspected child abuse syndrome (T. 108). Defendant admitted in 
Juvenile Court that he had abused Preston (T. 636, 662). The 
court ordered defendant to leave the house and restrained him 
from disciplining Preston (T. 635, 664). However, defendant 
resided with Nancy and Preston a while later (T. 382, 385). 
Defendant also admits to using excessive punishment on 
Preston. Defendant admits sucking on Preston's ears and bruising 
them (T. 634). He would place Preston on the toilet seat and 
leave him there for one to two hours (T. 665, 667). He would 
spank Preston hard without Preston's pants on (T. 638, 665). 
Defendant also would put Preston in cold bath water as a form of 
punishment and dunk Preston's head under the water (T. 288, 638). 
It can be inferred from the evidence and defendant's 
past history that defendant was intentionally or knowingly 
abusing Preston on the night he died. Defendant was alone with 
Preston while Nancy went to Burger King to buy their dinner (T. 
645). Right before Nancy left, defendant spanked Preston and 
then Nancy put him on the toilet (T. 399-400). Defendant claims 
that 2-3 minutes after Nancy left, he heard Preston grunt, went 
to the bathroom, and found Preston on the floor having difficulty 
breathing (T. 646-47). He picked Preston up, tried blowing in 
his mouth and ran to his neighbor's house (T. 647). The 
neighbors called the paramedics who arrived 3-4 minutes later (T. 
650). Preston was pronounced dead at the hospital. 
The medical testimony indicates Preston's injuries 
could not have been caused by Preston falling off the toilet onto 
a carpeted floor (T. 42). The injuries Preston suffered would be 
commonly found in a person who had been in a car accident or 
severely beaten (T. 42). Thus, defendant's testimony is 
inconsistent with the medical evidence. 
Furthermore, defendant also gave conflicting statements 
to the paramedics, the police and the by-standers about whether 
Preston was standing or lying on the floor when defendant entered 
the bathroom and whether Preston had spoken to defendant (T. 148, 
164-65, 182, 507). Preston also had blood on his lips and there 
were drops of Preston's blood on the carpet and the toilet (T. 
157, 213-14). 
Although Nancy was alone in the bathroom with Preston 
prior to leaving, Nancy did not hit Preston and he did not fall 
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against the toilet (T. 466). Preston climbed onto the toilet 
himself and Nancy did not notice anything wrong with him (T. 
436). 
The clear weight of this evidence is not contrary to 
the verdict. The evidence places defendant at the scene of the 
crime and the physical evidence supports the trial court's 
judgment that the defendant abused Preston. Although defendant 
presented evidence to show Nancy also disciplined Preston, the 
trial court chose to believe only defendant used excessive 
punishment on Preston. This court should defer to the trial 
court's determination of defendant's credibility, Goodman, 763 
P.2d at 787. Thus, the findings that defendant is guilty of 
second degree murder are not clearly erroneous. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the jury could believe, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant committed the second degree 
murder. Thus, the State requests this Court to affirm 
defendant's conviction. 
DATED this /ljf\ day of August, 1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
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